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Abstract 
A distributed system model is studied, where individual agents play repeatedly against each 
other and change their strategies based upon previous play. It is shown how to model this 
environment in terms of continuous population densities of agent types. A complication 
arises because the population densities of different strategies depend upon each other not 
only through game payoffs, but also through the strategy distributions themselves. In spite of 
this, it is shown that when an agent imitates the strategy of his previous opponent at a 
sufficiently high rate, the system of equations which governs the dynamical evolution of 
agent populations can be reduced to one equation for the total population. In a sense, the 
dynamics 'collapse' to the dynamics of the entire system taken as a whole, which describes 
the behavior of all types of agents. We explore the implications of this model, and present 
both analytical and simulation results. 
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1 Introduction
Distributed models of heterogeneity, in which many agents engage in repeated play against
each other in a spatial or network environment, are pervasive in the social sciences and
particularly in Economics (see e.g. Brock and Durlauf [2002, 2003], Kirchkamp and Nagel
[2001], Kirchkamp [2000], and Epstein and Axtell [1996] for a small subset of such models,
and Tesfatsion and Judd [forthcoming 2006] Handbook of Computational Economics Vol.
2 for an overview). These models are of interest because they allow complicated behavior
to emerge, as many different types of agents can interact with each other in a complex
variety of ways over time. As this behavior is usually too complicated to admit a closed
form, analytical solutions of a model’s quantitative and/or qualitative properties are often
obtained by appealing to the ergodicity of the system, and by resorting to numerical,
Monte Carlo simulations.
Recently, Dorofeenko and Shorish [2005] have shown how to take one class of models
of this type and formulate a close analytical approximation of its behavior. This approach
takes as fundamental not the individual players, but rather the probability distribution of
the types of players over some area of interaction. By appealing to this level of abstrac-
tion, analytically quantifiable conclusions may be generated even though the underlying
discrete dynamics are very complicated. Our prototypical example demonstrated that
the demographic prisoner’s dilemma model of the form given in Epstein (1998) admits
an analytical representation, and that the stable spatial structures found in Epstein’s
paper lose their stability and become metastable in the continuous space environment.
The structure of the continuous approximation employed allowed for both analytical and
numerical simulations on the approximation to be performed, which served as a usual
benchmarking procedure when compared to the original model.
One feature of the demographic prisoner’s dilemma as formulated above is that agents
are endowed with a fixed strategy type. That is, they do not adjust their game strategy in
the face of prior (or expected future) experience. Although agents are heterogeneous with
respect to both playing location and to ‘wealth’ (a measure of their aggregate payoff from
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all previous games played), once born they inherit the game strategy which was played by
their forbearers. While this assumption is certainly useful from a technical standpoint, it
does render the economic agents more as ‘zero-intelligence’ traders rather than as players
capable of adaptive behavior, which is more realistic. This paper addresses the issue by
analyzing an extension of the demographic prisoner’s dilemma which allows individual
agents to switch strategies based upon the outcome of previous play. That is, agents are
allowed to adapt their behavior according to what they have previously encountered.
The analysis proceeds along similar lines as in Dorofeenko and Shorish [2005], but the
introduction of adaptive behavior changes the continuous approximation in several ways.
Thus, although the abstract formulation as a partial differential equation system remains
the same, solving the system analytically requires a new approach. Using techniques simi-
lar to those found in e.g. Krall and Trivelpiece [1986], we approximate the dynamics of the
system by noting that, provided there is ‘enough’ memory of what was previously played,
the different strategies available to the agents tend to evolve in the same way. That is,
we can approximate the multi-dimensional system of many strategies by a single relation,
which (in a sense to be made precise) summarizes the ‘total’ movement of the entire sys-
tem. Within this approximation’s domain of applicability (viz., models which contain two
strategies), the resulting dynamical equation can then be numerically simulated.
In addition, we present (as yet) speculative work on obtaining qualitative results of the
resulting approximated system, by considering the evolution of an entropy measure from
information theory and the physical sciences. This measure, known as ‘negentropy’, could
provide future analytical conclusions to be drawn about the approximated system, and
hence provide a unifying framework for both our approach and for previous simulation
work performed with e.g. cellular automata and other discrete systems.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model, and derives the
underlying system evolution (or ‘law of motion’) for a finite set of strategies. Section
3 describes the model approximation techniques used, focusing upon the single-variable
approximation applied to two strategies, and also introduces speculative work on deriving
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a qualitative stability measure from the negentropy concept. Section 4 then presents
numerical simulation results for the model, and Section 5 concludes. The validity of the
single-variable approximation given in Section 3 is proven in Appendix A, while Appendix
B summarizes the parameter selection and initial conditions for the numerical simulations.
2 The Model
The model is an extension of the demographic prisoner’s dilemma model of Epstein [1998],
modeled as a continuous stochastic process over a circle as in Dorofeenko and Shorish
[2005]. The model is an abstraction of an environment where individual agents move
randomly over a grid, and interact with other agents by playing a prisoner’s dilemma
game. Conditional upon the outcome of the game, agents either increase or decrease their
wealth according to the game’s payoff. If wealth falls below some threshold, the agent
dies, whereas if wealth is high enough, the agent has some probability of cloning itself
and generating another agent of the same ‘type’, i.e. generating another agent who will
play the same strategy. One of the interesting questions one may ask about such a model
is whether after a large number of interactions has passed, one of the prisoner’s dilemma
strategies (measured as a proportion of the population) is dominant, and whether or how
the various parameters of the model (such as the spatial extent of the grid, the payoffs
to the prisoner’s dilemma game, the probability of generating a ‘clone’, among others)
influence this proportion.
The underlying model is thus a finite state automata, which generates a complicated
system of interactions. The questions listed above are, then, questions about aggregate
features of the economy than about the characteristics of any given individual. Common to
models of such type, the ‘primitives’ are the behavior of the agent, the rules of interaction,
and any initial conditions of e.g. wealth or other endowments.
For brevity we refer the reader to Dorofeenko and Shorish [2005] for an in-depth
discussion of the approximation method used to move from the discrete finite-state system
to the continuous approximation used. We focus instead upon this approximation and its
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extension to a model in which the individual agents can adapt their strategy according to
the outcomes of previous game encounters, i.e. to the strategies of other players previously
met.
The model is defined over an interval of the real line with endpoints identified, i.e.
over a circle. Time is continuous, and at each time there exists a population density of
agents. This population density depends upon a strategy s ∈ S,1 where S is a finite set
of strategies available to each player, a wealth level w ∈ R+ held by a player, and finally
a location x ∈ [−L/2, L/2] (endpoints identified), which indicates where on the circle an
agent lies:
Definition 1. A population density function for those agents with strategy s, wealth level
w and location x at time t is a function f(s, w, x, t) such that given a subset of strategies
S1 ⊂ S, an interval [a, b] ∈ [−L/2, L/2] and a set of wealth levels [w, w¯], the number of
agents which possess strategy s ∈ S1, location x ∈ [a, b] and wealth level w ∈ [w, w¯] at t is
N(t) =
∫
[−L/2,L/2]
∫ w¯
w
∫ b
a
f(s, w, x, t)dxdwds. (2.1)
Agents may live or die in this environment. There are two ways for an agent to die.
First, there exists a probability mass d > 0 such that df(s, w, x, t) represents the mass of
agents at (s, w, x, t) who die at time t. Second, if an agent’s wealth drops to zero, it is
assumed to be unable to survive and so dies.
We also assume that there exists a rate of diffusion in the wealth space of the popula-
tion distribution f(s, w, x, t). We formalize this diffusion by defining a diffusion parameter
M , which measures how fast wealth diffuses from agents to their closest neighbors with
lower wealth. The diffusion in the wealth space in our model generates a non-uniform
wealth distribution between agents.
If an agent survives, it engages in random play with a neighbor. For each strategy pair
(s, s′), s, s′ ∈ S we associate a payoff νss′ from playing the game, where the agent plays
1In the analysis and simulations, agents play the prisoner’s dilemma game upon interaction, so the
strategy set is given by S = {c, d}, where c stands for ‘cooperate’ and d ‘defect’. We keep to the more
general formulation in setting up the model, however.
4
strategy s and the opponent plays s′. Note that the first subscript denotes the recipient
of the payoff–hence νss′ is the payoff for the agent who plays strategy s when an opponent
plays strategy s′. Generally, νss′ 6= νs′s.
Immediately after playing a game the agent may randomly clone itself by sacrificing a
level of wealth and adding to the population mass of its own strategy–this level of wealth
lost is also the threshold wealth for cloning, so that agents without at least this wealth
level do not clone. The wealth lost is fixed at an exogenous value w1, and for those agents
with at least w1 in wealth, the cloning probability is set exogenously to νb ∈ [0, 1].
Once game play and cloning have been performed, the agent moves to a nearby lo-
cation, and the process repeats itself. This causes diffusion of the population density in
location space, in the same way as having zero wealth causes diffusion in the wealth space.
For simplicity, we normalize the location diffusion parameter to one.
All newborn agents have their initial wealth levels drawn from a distribution defined
over the probability density function g(w). In order to keep the level of wealth in the
model stationary, we must assume that:
w1 := w¯ =
∫ ∞
0
w(g(w)dw. (2.2)
If w1 < (>)w¯, where w¯ is the mean wealth level of the population, then the cloning
process itself will add to (subtract from) the wealth level of the population.
Following Dorofeenko and Shorish [2005] the continuous approximation outlined above
is only valid when the time of interaction between agents (i.e. the time it take them to
play the prisoner’s dilemma game) is effectively instantaneous when compared with the
time of a ’period’ δt. This ensures that for any two-player interaction, the densities of
the strategies before and after the interaction remain essentially the same. This features
is also what allows us to model what it means for‘adaptive play’ in this framework.
Recall that in a discrete setting, an individual agent may adapt their strategy if they
condition their current (and/or future) play upon those strategies which were observed
as being played by previous competitors. Using the time assumption given above, we
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infer that in the continuous setting given here, adaptive play means that the population
density function of one strategy will be conditioned (within the time interval δt) upon the
population density functions of all other strategies. More properly, this means that the
change in the population density function of one strategy is dependent upon the level of
the population densities of the other strategies in the population.
For exposition a few further definitions are in order. First denote the total mass of
agents with strategy s at location x to be
n(s, x, t) :=
∫ ∞
0
f(s, w, x, t)dw, (2.3)
while the mass of those (s, x) agents with wealth level at least equal to w1, i.e. those
agents which have enough wealth to clone themselves is given by
n1(s, x, t) :=
∫ ∞
w1
f(s, w, x, t)dw. (2.4)
In addition, it is also useful to define the residual of the mass of agents located at a
point x, using the suggestive notation ‘e’ for ‘empty’:
ne(x, t) := 1−
∑
s∈S
n(s, x, t). (2.5)
Finally, we define for every strategy s, the net wealth transfer V (s, t) of the strategy
at time t. This wealth transfer incorporates the wealth gain due to the payoff from
interacting with other agents (playing the game), minus any loss of wealth due to cloning
(which costs the threshold wealth level w1). This net wealth transfer, again expressed as
a population aggregate, is:
V (s, x, t) :=
∑
s′∈S
νss′n(s
′, x, t)− νbw1ne(x, t)1w≥w1 , (2.6)
where 1w≥w1 is an indicator function, equal to one if wealth w is greater than the threshold
wealth w1, and zero otherwise.
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Armed with these definitions, we may specify the law of motion of the population
densities of this economy (for exposition we shall often suppress the dependence on (x, t)
and shorten f(s, w, x, t) to fs, n(s, x, t) to ns, n1(s, x, t) to n1s and V (s, x, t) to Vs when
doing so will cause no confusion):
∂fs
∂t
+
∂
∂w
(Vsfs)−M∂
2fs
∂w2
− ∂
2fs
∂x2
= νbnen1sg(w)−dfs+ns
∑
s′∈S
λs′sfs′−fs
∑
s′∈S
λss′ns′ . (2.7)
We shall interpret this system (and define the terms λss′) shortly. In order to solve
this system, both initial and boundary conditions must be specified. The initial condition
for the population density of strategy s is
f(s, w, x, 0) := f0(s, w, x), (2.8)
where f0 is the initial population density of strategy s.
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There are also boundary conditions for wealth and location. The wealth boundary
conditions ensure that no one possesses exactly zero wealth, and unbounded wealth is
also impossible:
f(s, 0, x, t) = 0∀x, t; lim
w→∞
f(s, w, x, t) = 0∀x, t. (2.9)
The location boundary conditions ensure that the population densities are periodic
over the circle, so that both the values and the first derivatives agree everywhere:
f(s, w,−L/2, t) = f(s, w, L/2, t); ∂fs
∂x
∣∣∣∣
x=−L/2
=
∂fs
∂x
∣∣∣∣
x=L/2
∀w, t. (2.10)
2In the numerical simulations it was assumed that for each strategy the joint density f0(s, w, x) over
wealth and space could be decomposed into the product of two marginal densities, one defined over wealth
and one defined over space. See Appendix B.
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2.1 Interpretation of the PDE representation
The PDE representation of the population density f(s, w, x, t) is similar to that studied
in Dorofeenko and Shorish (2005), but it contains a few notable differences. Most impor-
tantly, the last two terms of (2.7) together describe the ‘memory’ of the population from
previous play, and λss′ is a coefficient used to indicate how strong memory plays a role in
deciding which strategy to choose. For example, the first of these terms, given by
n(s, x, t)
∑
s′∈S
λs′sfs′ , (2.11)
shows how many new agents have decided to switch to strategy s from strategy s′ based
upon previous play. The term λs′sfs′ is the proportion of the density of those agents
playing fs′ who would, if facing strategy s, decide to switch to s. The total mass of such
agents who actually switch are those who actually face agents playing strategy s, which
is given by n(s, x, t). Thus, the total mass of agents switching from s′ to s is simply the
product of n(s, x, t) and λs′sfs′ . Summing over all possible strategies s
′ ∈ S yields (2.11).
Similarly, the second term indicates how much population mass is lost from strategy s,
where λss′f(s, w, x, t) shows how many strategy s players have the potential to switch to s
′,
and the product λss′f(s, w, x, t)n(s
′, x, t) indicates how many actually switch. Summing
over all possible strategies s′ yields the desired relation, which is subtracted from the
population mass of strategy s.
The coefficients λss′ thus measure the importance of ‘memory’ in determining which
strategy adds to (or subtracts from) its population density. These coefficients depend
upon the payoffs of the game being played, and are by no means stationary in general.
However, for ease of analysis we assumed that they take on fixed values in time, so that the
problem remains stationary. In addition, we presume that the matrix of λ’s is symmetric,
so that λss′ = λs′s. This matrix may be thought of as a matrix of ‘switching rates’ or
‘coupling coefficients’ linking one strategy set to another–note finally that own-switching
carries a coefficient of zero, so that λss = 0 ∀s ∈ S.
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3 Model Approximation
The term
φs :=
∑
s′∈S
(λss′(nsfs′ − ns′fs)) (3.1)
has an analogous relationship to a type of friction in fluid dynamics. In particular, if
the coefficients λss′ are large enough, they overwhelm the dynamics of (2.7) and the
problem becomes one of defining the evolution of Markov switching between strategies
independent of direct game payoffs, cloning and death rates, etc. It may be the case
that this switching between strategies continues until a stationary solution is found (see
Section 3.2 on ‘Negentropy’ and our speculative efforts to prove that such a solution is
stable under this dynamical system). If this is the case, then each strategy mass fs is a
stable proportion of a ‘total density’ f :=
∑
s∈S fs, such that
fs =
ns
n
f + δfs, |δfs|  f ∀s, (3.2)
where n = n(x, t) :=
∑
s∈S ns.
3
We show in Section 3.1 below that this simplification can in fact be performed if the
system has only two strategies. Anticipating what follows, let us continue and show how
the system can be reduced to a single law of motion.
By aggregating (2.7) over s and substituting (3.2) into the result, and noting that
∑
s∈S
φs = 0,
we find that
∂f
∂t
+
∂
∂w
(V f)−M ∂
2f
∂w2
− ∂
2f
∂x2
= νbnen1g(w)− df, (3.3)
where V := 1
n
∑
s∈S nsVs is the average net gain or loss from game-playing in the economy,
since V may also be written as V = 1
n
∑
s,s′∈S νss′nsns′ .
3For future reference, we also define n1 = n1(x, t) :=
∑
s∈S n1s as the total density of all agents who
have enough wealth to clone themselves.
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The dynamics given by (3.3) determine the law of motion of the entire system, via the
approximation given by (3.2). This problem is easier to solve than the original system
(2.7). Approximation (3.2) also implies that the ‘spatial densities’ ns also obey certain
restrictions:
∂ns
∂t
− ∂
2ns
∂x2
= νbnen1 − dns −M ∂fs
∂w
∣∣∣∣
w=0
. (3.4)
Since from (3.2) we know that
n1s =
n1
n
ns, (3.5)
∂fs
∂w
∣∣∣∣
w=0
=
ns
n
∂f
∂w
∣∣∣∣
w=0
, (3.6)
we may substitute these relations into (3.4) to yield
∂ns
∂t
− ∂
2ns
∂x2
=
[
νbne
n1
n
− d−M 1
n
∂f
∂w
∣∣∣∣
w=0
]
ns. (3.7)
This relation may also be expressed in terms of the total spatial density n:
∂n
∂t
− ∂
2n
∂x2
= νbnen1 −
[
d+M
1
n
∂f
∂w
∣∣∣∣
w=0
]
n. (3.8)
Defining αs = α(s, x, t) := n(s, x, t)/n(x, t) we may finally express the above relations as:
∂αs
∂t
− ∂
2αs
∂x2
− 2∂αs
∂x
∂
∂x
lnn = 0. (3.9)
Equations (3.2), (3.3) and (3.7) thus comprise the complete system for the total density
approximation.
3.1 Two Strategy Approximation
It remains to be shown that the approximation given in (3.2) is actually valid. To do so, we
restrict our attention to systems with only two strategies (such as the canonical repeated
prisoner’s dilemma game) and define a domain of applicability for the approximation.
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First, we define the conditional probability densities at a given spatial point x, i.e. the
‘normalized’ probability density for each strategy s = c, d:
ϕs(x,w, t) :=
fs(x,w, t)
ns(x, t)
. (3.10)
Using this definition, the general system (2.7) may be rewritten in the form:
∂ϕs
∂t
+
∂
∂w
(Vsϕs)−M∂
2ϕs
∂w2
− ∂
2ϕs
∂x2
− 2∂ϕs
∂x
∂
∂x
lnns = (3.11)
νbneβsg(w)−
(
νbneβs +M
(
∂ϕs
∂w
)
w=0
)
ϕs +
∑
s′∈S
λs′sns′ϕs′ − ϕs
∑
s′∈S
λss′nr,
where
βs =
n1s
ns
=
∫ ∞
w1
ϕs dw
is the mass of type s agents who can clone themselves relative to the total number of
agents of that strategy type.
As in the unmodified law of motion (2.7), it is the relative size and frequency of the
‘memory terms’ λss′ which determines how differently the normalized densities ϕs, ϕs′
behave. If there are only two strategies, in fact, the difference between the two densities
ϕc and ϕd can be expressed as a difference term which fluctuates on a scale faster than
the mean transition time τ ∼ λ−1 between strategies. In other words, the behavior of the
two densities can be captured (to this degree of precision) by the dynamics of a ‘total
density’ function, denoted ϕ, and a ‘difference density’ denoted ϕ˜:
ϕ :=
nc
n
ϕc +
nd
n
ϕd,
ϕ˜ := ϕc − ϕd, (3.12)
with n(x, t) := nc + nd representing the total mass of all individuals at (x, t), regardless
of strategy.
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Notice that if ϕ˜ varies symmetrically (so that there is no bias) and quickly (so that
the law of large numbers applies) during the mean transition time τ , then for all intents
and purposes it vanishes during the time scale which drives the dynamics. This means
that over this time scale, the dynamics of ϕc and ϕd, and hence of ϕ itself, are essentially
the same, i.e. ϕc ' ϕd ' ϕ + O(λ−1), and that all three distributions follow the law of
motion governed by (2.7). The proof that ϕ˜ vanishes to order τ is given in the Appendix.
The resulting dynamical system after imposing this approximation is
∂
∂t
(nϕ) +
∂
∂w
(V nϕ)−
(
M
∂2
∂w2
+
∂2
∂x2
)
(nϕ) = νbneβng(w)− dn. (3.13)
This system is the two strategy approximation of the system (2.7), and is equivalent to
(3.3) with restrictions (3.7). It is this approximation that is used to derive the simulations
of the system in Section 4.
3.2 Negentropy
It must be shown that the approximation (3.2) of the dynamics of the system as repre-
sented by the general formulation (2.7) is stable, that is, for an open and dense set of
initial conditions, the system (2.7) will converge to a stationary distribution given by 3.2).
Similar to the stability properties of a Lyapunov function, we introduce a ‘negentropy’
function H(t) for this system. Such a function H(t) can be obtained under the assumption
of the symmetry of the coefficients λss′ = λs′s.
The negentropy function is defined as:
H(t) =
∫ ∞
0
∫ L/2
−L/2
∑
s∈S
G (fs) dwdx ≡
∫ ∑
s∈S
G (fs) dwdx, (3.14)
where the function G(f) satisfies the conditions:
G(0) = G′(0) = 0, (G(f), G′(f), G′′(f)) ≥ 0,∀f ≥ 0 (3.15)
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The simple example of such a function is G(f) = fα, 1 ≤ α. The more conventional
example: G(f) = (1 + f)[ln(1 + f)− 1].
Multiplying each of equations (2.7) by G′(fs), integrating by w and x over the solution
domain 0 < w <∞, −L/2 < x < L/2 and taking a sum over the index s, we obtain:
H˙ = νb
(
w1
∫ L/2
−L/2
ne
∑
s∈S
[fs (w1)G
′ (fs (w1))−G (fs (w1))] dx+
∫
neg(w)
∑
s∈S
n1sG
′ (fs) dwdx
)
−
∫ ∑
s∈S
[
M
(
∂fs
∂w
)2
+
(
∂fs
∂x
)2]
G′′ (fs) dwdx− d
∫ ∑
s∈S
fsG
′ (fs) dwdx (3.16)
− 1
2
∫ ∑
s,s′∈S
λss′nsns′ [G
′ (fs)−G′ (fs′)]
(
fs
ns
− fs′
ns′
)
dwdx
The first term in parentheses is non-negative, because fG′(f)−G(f) = ∫ f
0
fG′′(f)df ≥ 0.
However, the sign of the frictional term is not defined.
Thus, the birth process yields the non-negative negentropy production, while all the
other processes excluding the last one yield the non-positive negentropy production. This
function can be used in the total density approximation, where the frictional term is
absent.
We may introduce the other negentropy function using G(f/n) in (3.14) instead of
G(f). Then the frictional term produces the non-positive contribution:
−1
2
∫ ∑
s,s′∈S
λss′nsns′
[
G′
(
fs
ns
)
−G′
(
fs′
ns′
)](
fs
ns
− fs′
ns′
)
dwdx (3.17)
but the sign of contribution of some other terms (namely, spatial diffusion and birth rate
terms) is not defined in that case. Future analysis may allow us to use this negentropy
function to derive analytical stability results for the total density approximation of Section
3.1.
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4 Simulations
The dynamical system given by (2.7) can be simulated once the parameters of the model
have been specified. These simulations used a discretized grid to approximate the PDE
system in the wealth and location space. For illustrative purposes, the simulation results
presented here are based upon one specification of the parameter set, the values of which
are defined in the Appendix. These results, while not generalizable, nonetheless present
the reader with some mode of comparison between an environment where memory is
relevant for distributed systems, and an environment where memory is absent.
The simulations of the full system with memory were compared to a ‘benchmark’
system without memory. As shown in Dorofeenko and Shorish [2005] the environment
without memory admits a metastable cooperative structure, which later decays to zero.
Defectors, while initially profiting from the cooperators in a similar fashion to ‘predatory-
prey’ interaction, eventually also die out as cooperators become ever more scarce.
In order to remain within the limits of the single-component approximation, a scale
value for the memory switching term λ = λcd = λdc was chosen which demonstrates how
the cooperator and defector probability densities converge to the same ‘total’ density after
a characteristic time period at the order of 1/λ. For the simulations, this memory term
was set to λ = 20. For the benchmark model without memory, λ = 0.
Figures 1 and 2 compare the long-run evolution of the system with and without mem-
ory, for the spatial densities of cooperators (diamonds, in red) and defectors (stars, in
blue).4 As can be seen, the dynamical systems with and without memory behave in a
similar fashion–given a small initial concentration of cooperators in a uniform ‘sea’ of de-
fectors, there is first the development of a tight central cluster of cooperators surrounded
by defectors on the sides. As time progresses, the cooperator cluster waxes and then
wanes, and both densities eventually converge to the stationary state where all agents die
out.
Judging from the spatial densities alone one would conclude that the two systems
4Note that in order to display these animations and the animation of Figure 6 correctly, this PDF
document must be opened on a system which can handle the AVI movie format.
14
(Loading density evolution...)
Figure 1: Density Evolution Without Memory (λ = 0)
Play NormalPlay Slow Pause/Resume
(Loading density evolution...)
Figure 2: Density Evolution With Memory (λ = 20)
Play NormalPlay Slow Pause/Resume
are roughly equivalent, and the existence of memory does not substantially alter the
conclusions that one would draw in the absence of the switching terms given by λ–the
main difference is in speed, as the system with memory takes longer to dissipate. But an
examination of the probability density functions over both the location and wealth space
tell a different story. Although it is true that the long run time evolution of the system
is identical with and without memory, the densities evolve in a different way.
Figure 3 for cooperators and Figure 4 for defectors each compare the probability
densities for the system without memory to the system with memory. Although the
time evolution for systems with and without memory appear similar, they still exhibit
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differences along their respective time paths. For example, Figure 3(b) indicates that the
cooperator density with memory has ‘tails’ at relatively low wealth levels, which differs
from the density without memory given in Figure 3(a). In addition, comparing Figure
3(b) with Figure 4(b) shows that at these low wealth levels, the probability density of
cooperators looks very similar to the probability density for defectors in the environment
with memory. That is, there exists a tendency for the probability mass of cooperators
to cluster at points in common with the probability mass of defectors when memory is
present.
(a) Cooperator Density, λ = 0 (b) Cooperator Density, λ = 20
Figure 3: Cooperator Densities Without and With Memory
(a) Defector Density, λ = 0 (b) Defector Density, λ = 20
Figure 4: Defector Densities Without and With Memory
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This tendency is due to the fact that after a certain period of time, the ‘relaxation
time’ of the system, both normalized probability densities ϕc and ϕd converge toward each
other. Figure 5 compares the behavior of these normalized densities at a given location
in space, as they evolve over a range of wealth values. Figure 5(a) shows that even after a
sufficiently long period of time, the normalized densities without memory remain different
from each other–indeed, this difference remains throughout the evolution of the system,
until both populations die out. This is due to the fact that when the switching rate λ = 0,
i.e. when memory effects are absent, the characteristic relaxation time is 1/0 = ∞. It
takes an infinitely long period of time for the normalized densities to converge to each
other.
(a) Normalized Density, λ = 0 (b) Normalized Density, λ = 20
Figure 5: Differences Between Normalized Densities, Without and With Memory
By contrast, Figure 5(b) demonstrates that in the environment with memory, after
sufficient time has passed the normalized densities converge toward each other, and a
one-dimensional system emerges. The amount of time which must pass, the relaxation
time, is here on the order of 1/20 = 0.05, and the observed time to convergence is around
τ ' 0.2. This convergence is also demonstrated in Figure 6, which shows an animated
time evolution of the normalized densities over wealth–around the characteristic time of
τ ' 0.2, the two densities converge to the same ‘total density’ representation.
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(Loading density evolution...)
Figure 6: Evolution of Normalized Density, λ = 20
Play NormalPlay Slow Pause/Resume
5 Conclusion
In using the PDE representation to explore multiple agent interaction with memory, we
have relied upon the observation that when examining aggregate behavior, it is not vital
to associate memory with a specific individual, or collection of individuals. Rather, the
evolution of the likelihood of adopting one or another strategy can be influenced by a
‘collective memory’ that affects the population as a whole.
This interpretation of memory allows one to specify a continuous approximation to the
underlying discrete system, using standard techniques in a novel way. In this fashion, we
have shown how memory can be incorporated into the framework introduced in Dorofeenko
and Shorish [2005]. In addition, the introduction of memory also transfers characteristics
of one strategy to the population of the other–and if this rate of transfer is high enough,
the distinction between the evolution of the two strategies over time becomes blurred.
Even though each strategy still carries with it payoffs which are different from the other
strategy, the system as a whole behaves, in some sense, as though it were governed by a
single composite strategy with characteristics of both.
It is unclear whether the interpretation of memory as we have defined it is the most
efficient method of applying continuous approximation methods to discrete systems. It
is also not known how the global, asymptotic properties of the system behave (although
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work on negentropy is providing one possible direction for future research). We can
argue, at least, that simulation results with some form of analytical representation of the
underlying system, as we have presented here, are more useful to the researcher than such
simulations results presented as a ‘black box’ outcome. Being able to formulate a memory
model in terms of a system of probability densities sheds new light on the effects we might
expect to see in real-world interactions of this sort. After all, it is very unlikely that real-
world interactions can be measured at the individual level–rather, it is the statistics of a
population of agents which proves to be most relevant to the researcher. Explaining the
evolution and dynamics of these statistics, then, is of prime importance when attempting
to understand the behavior of a complicated collection of heterogeneous agents.
Future research is now focusing upon developing this paradigm for use in a wide
class of interaction models over a discrete space–in particular, applying our technique
to endogenous network formation seems like a natural next step, as until now the local
interaction properties have been specified ex ante. In addition, we shall free ourselves from
one particular game theoretic specification (the repeated prisoner’s dilemma problem) and
attempt to examine more complicated interaction and payoff environments. In this we
shall most likely need to draw upon methods of analysis which belong to the ‘mesoscopic’
scale as defined in the natural sciences, whereby individual interactions are too numerous
to completely specify, but the system taken as whole is still too small for population
aggregation to provide the dynamics of interest.
At the present moment, our tool is still of limited use–it may be likened to a rather
dim and wavering flashlight beam that we use to tread, step by step, upon a darkened
path strewn with those small problems we can illuminate. The goal is to see not just this
path, but the entire landscape of complex, dynamic, decentralized heterogenous agent
interaction models, in a way which allows us to make meaningful analytical statements
about the global and aggregate properties of the system. It is true that to achieve this goal,
we may very well need a lighthouse–but our small flashlight may have scaling properties
which have hitherto been unexploited.
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Appendices
A Perturbation Expansion for the Two Strategy Ap-
proximation
The dynamical system (2.7) is first rewritten in terms of ϕ and ϕ˜), and expressed as
expansion terms in those perturbations which are of smaller order than the relaxation
time:
∂
∂t
(nϕ) +
∂
∂w
(
V nϕ+
ncnd
n
(Vc − Vd) ϕ˜
)
−
(
M
∂2
∂w2
+
∂2
∂x2
)
(nϕ) = (A.1)
νbneβng(w)− dnϕ,
∂ϕ˜
∂t
+
∂
∂x
(
2ϕ˜
∂
∂x
ln
(ncnd
n
)
− ∂ϕ˜
∂x
)
= −λnϕ˜+ h, (A.2)
h= 2ϕ˜
∂2
∂x2
ln
(ncnd
n
)
− ∂
∂w
(
ncVd + ndVc
n
ϕ˜+ (Vc − Vd)ϕ
)
+M
∂2ϕ˜
∂w2
+
2
∂ϕ
∂x
∂
∂x
ln
nc
nd
+ νbne
(
β˜g(w)− β˜ϕ− βϕ˜+ nc − nd
n
β˜ϕ˜
)
+ (A.3)
M
(
nc − nd
n
ϕ˜
(
∂ϕ˜
∂w
)
w=0
− ϕ˜
(
∂ϕ
∂w
)
w=0
− ϕ
(
∂ϕ˜
∂w
)
w=0
)
,
where (similar to the previous approximation (3.11))
β =
n1
n
=
∫ ∞
w1
ϕdw,
and the associated difference is
β˜ = βc − βd =
∫ ∞
w1
ϕ˜ dw.
The probability transition for ϕ˜ given in (A.2) depends upon the large parameter λ,
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which drives the overall dynamics. The parameter h, on the other hand, which is defined
by the expression (A.3), is a small perturbation–its effects are negligible at this level of
the approximation of the general system.
Equation (A.2) can be simplified by the transition to new variables (x, t)→ (x0, t):
∂
∂t
(
ϕ˜
∂x
∂x0
)
= −λnϕ˜ ∂x
∂x0
+ h, (A.4)
∂x
∂t
= 2
∂
∂x
ln
(ncnd
n
)
−
(
ϕ˜
∂x
∂x0
)−1
∂ϕ˜
∂x0
. (A.5)
Equation (A.5) represents the definition of the variable transformation x = x(t, x0),
while and equation (A.4) is derived from (A.2) by the substitution of that definition into
it.
The initial conditions at t = 0 have the form: x(0, x0) = x0, ϕ˜(0, x0) = ϕ˜0(x0), where
ϕ˜0(x) is the initial condition for ϕ˜(t, x) in (A.2).
The estimate for ϕ˜(x, t) can be derived from equation of (A.4) when considering the
term h as an external function:
ϕ˜
∂x
∂x0
= ϕ˜0 (x0) exp
(
−λ
∫ t
0
n (x (x0, t
′) , t′) dt′
)
+ (A.6)∫ t
0
h (t1) exp
(
−λ
∫ t
t1
n (x (x0, t
′) , t′) dt′
)
dt1.
Taking into account that λ is a large parameter and replacing the second integral by its
asymptotic estimate, we obtain:
ϕ˜
∂x
∂x0
' ϕ˜0 (x0) exp
(
−λ
∫ t
0
n (x (x0, t
′) , t′) dt′
)
+ λ−1
h(t)
n(x, t)
+O
(
λ−2
)
. (A.7)
Thus for the time period of order τ ∼ λ−1 the value ϕ˜ ∂x
∂x0
is decreasing up to order
∼ λ−1.
To make the same statement about the function ϕ˜ itself, we also need to make sure
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that the partial derivative ∂x
∂x0
is not vanishing for that time period and remains of the
same order as it initially was. To do that, substitute the first term of estimate (A.7) into
equation (A.5):
∂x
∂t
= λ
(
∂x
∂x0
)−1 ∫ t
0
∂n
∂x
∂x
∂x0
dt′ −
(
∂x
∂x0
)−1
∂
∂x0
ln ϕ˜0 + (A.8)
∂2x
∂x20
(
∂x
∂x0
)−2
+ 2
∂
∂x
ln
(ncnd
n
)
.
Keeping in (A.8) only the main asymptotic term ∼ λ, we obtain after differentiation
by t:
∂
∂t
(
∂x
∂x0
∂x
∂t
)
' λ∂n
∂x
∂x
∂x0
. (A.9)
The substitution τ = λ1/2t into (A.9) removes the explicit dependence of λ, so that
x(t, x0;λ) = x(λ
1/2t, x0). (A.10)
This implies that the function x as well as its derivative ∂x
∂x0
changes substantially at the
time order ∼ λ−1/2, which is much greater than the relaxation time τ ∼ λ−1. Thus, the
estimate (A.7) can finally be rewritten as:
ϕ˜ ' ϕ˜0(x) exp (−λn0(x)t) +O
(
λ−1
)
(A.11)
When writing (A.11), we take into account the obvious relation
(
∂x
∂x0
)
t=0
≡ 1 and that
the spatial density n(x, t) obeys the “slow” equation (3.8)–in this case it does not change
substantially for the relaxation time τ , and can be replaced by its initial value n0(x).
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B Simulation Initial Conditions and Parameters
The simulations were run using Mathematica 5, by numerically solving the partial differ-
ential equation system 2.7. In order to do so, several parameters were fixed. First, Table
1 shows the game payoffs for the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma:
Game Payoffs
C D
C (1.0,1.0) (-1.8,2.0)
D (2.0,-1.8) (-1.3,-1.3)
Table 1: Payoff matrix for the Prisoner’s Dilemma game.
(c) = cooperate, (d) = defect
The probability distribution g(w) for the wealth of a cloned agent was set to
g (w) :=
15
16∆w0
[
1−
(
w − w0
∆w0
)2]2
ϑ (∆w0 − |w − w0|) , (B.1)
where the mean parameter w0 = 0.5, the spread ∆w0 = 0.5/3, and ϑ (x) is an indicator
function taking the value 1 when its argument is positive, and 0 otherwise.
The initial joint probability density f0(s, w, x, ) for a strategy s was decomposed into
two marginal densities–this substantially simplified the numerical analysis. The marginal
densities were the initial wealth density fs(w), and the initial spatial density fs(x), so
that f0(s, w, x) := fs(w)fs(x).
The initial wealth probability densities of cooperators and defectors were identical, i.e.
fc(w) = fd(w), and had the same functional form as the wealth density for a cloned agent
g(w). The mean parameter was w0 = 1, while the spread was again ∆w0 = 0.5/3.
The initial spatial densities of the cooperators and defectors, fc(x) and fd(x), were
different–the population of cooperators was given a larger (probabilistic) concentration
than defectors in a centralized region of space, to compare and replicate earlier work
in Dorofeenko and Shorish [2005] and to examine the metastability of any cooperator
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structure which might emerge. The initial defector density was uniform over the interval.
For the cooperator density,
fc(x) := 0.5 + 0.25 cos
(
2pi
L
x
)
, (B.2)
while the initial defector density was set to
fd(x) := 0.2. (B.3)
Other parameters: the spatial interval was defined as [−25, 25] with endpoints identi-
fied, so that L = 50. Wealth was defined over the interval [0, 60]. The threshold level of
wealth for cloning was w1 = .67. The wealth diffusion parameter M = 0.04. The cloning
rate of new agents νb = 1, while the death rate for all agents was d = 0.01.
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